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POLITICAL STRUCTURAL REFORM AND THE
FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA
Gao Xian *
In May of 1989, Westerners watched with fascination as Tiananmen Square in
Beijing became home to a prodemocracy student demonstration at the very heart
of the capital of the People's Republic of China. Though the Chinese government
had made an effort to liberalize certain of its policies in the late 1980's, this
massive expression of protest appeared to epitomize several years of popular
movement toward greater democratization in that country. However, Western
fascination turned to horror when, on June 3-4, units of the Chinese People's
Army occupied Tiananmen, crushing the demonstration and killing hundreds,
maybe thousands, of student protestors.
Notwithstanding this brutal suppression, the Chinese people and government
still face key questions-specifically, whether or not the prodemocracy genie,
once let out, can or should be put back into the bottle. Professor Gao Xian of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences addressed some of these questions during
a lecture sponsored by the Journal of Legislation, given at the Notre Dame Law
School on December 1, 1988. The following essay was adapted from Professor
Gao's talks. While its author could not speculate as to the future of popular
movements such as Tiananmen, or to their fate, the editors believe his observations
remain relevant to any discussion of China's political and economic future.
This essay is presented under the auspices of Notre Dame's International
Law Society and Notre Dame's Center for Civil and Human Rights.
INTRODUCTION
Democratization is an important political trend in many socialist countries
ioday. The People's Republic of China also faces, in the course of its present
reform and development, a political structural reform with democratization as
its focus. The overall purpose of China's reforms, open policies and moderni-
zation, is the integrated development of the entire society. This not only includes
the modernization of the economy, but also the modernization of politics, culture
and of its citizens views. But political structural reform is the important precon-
dition and guarantee for these other reforms.
This essay is divided into three parts. Part I will examine general ideas of
China's political structural reform. This part will contain a partial digest of
official arguments and mainstream ideas about the current reforms. Part II
contains several comments on these reformist ideas. Finally, Part III of this essay
will look at a few points of comparison between reforms in China and those
now taking place in the Soviet Union. These three parts are not of equal length.
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The first is the most important, as it provides grounding for thinking about the
current political reforms going on in China. The second part is the writer's
personal view. And the third part, although it is important and interesting, will
touch upon its topic only briefly, as a firmer conclusion would require further
research and explication beyond the scope of this essay.
PART I: GENERAL IDEAS OF CHINA'S POLITICAL STRUCTURAL
REFORM
A. The Process of Political Structural Reform in China
China's need to transform all of its productive relations and economic
structures which are still incompatible with the development of productive forces
was first pointed out by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, by the
Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP. This
session, in its bulletin, also called for the economic reform of all inadequate
ways of management, action and thinking. In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping
pointed out that defects in the current leadership and cadre systems of both the
Party and the government had close links to the highly centralized system which
had existed since the founding of the People's Republic. Recently, the CCP
revised its leadership setup, establishing a Secretariat to strengthen the Party's
collective leadership. The new Constitution adopted in 1982 promoted the division
of work between the Party and the government, stipulated a term of years to
replace the life term of office for heads of state and established an "individual
responsibility system" for the administrative heads of various governmental levels.
At the same time, China's statutory legal framework was strengthened. These
all-important measures will help dilute the age-old concentration of power in
China. The Thirteenth Party Congress of October 1987 systematically put forth
the programs, contents and targets of political structural reform to set the overall
political reform in motion.
B. Defects of the Existing Political Structure
The main defects of China's political structure include overconcentration of
power, serious bureaucraticism, remnant feudalism and other related problems.
Overconcentration of Power. China's existing political structure has felt the
impact of the Soviet model, but it also bears the imprint of traditional Chinese
political institutions. It is closely bound up with China's old traditional ideas
and with the belief that a socialist country should adopt an administrative structure
with a high concentration of power in the hands of a central leadership. High
concentration of power remains the fundamental characteristic of the current
political structure in China.
Confusion of Functions Between the Party and Government. Owing to
historical reasons, Party organizations at different levels have, for a long period
of time, usurped the functions of legislation, jurisdiction and administration of
the state and the government.
Defects in the Organizational Setup and the Personnel System. This problem
closely relates to overconcentration of power. Influenced as they are by ancient
ideas of a very traditional culture, most Chinese citizens lack any conception of
decentralization. They tend to think that the higher the position, the better the
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ability of the officeholder to make decisions for his or her subordinates. There-
fore, a clearcut division of responsibility and authority was often missing among
different bureaucratic levels and among different organizations or different posts.
Since power was overcentralized, local initiatives could not be fully unleashed.
Overconcentration of power in the hands of the leadership and defects in
the personnel system have dampened the initiative of the rank and file government
staff. Generally, government officials have had a rigid set of rules to follow and
have been unable to treat issues in an independent and responsible way. As a
result, they have been kept busy all the time submitting reports and asking for
directives. There was also the above mentioned problem of "permanent posi-
tions."
Blurring the Lines Between Government Functions and Enterprise Activities.
Under the old ways, ostensibly private enterprises and many different social
organizations became virtual annexes to government organs. Many affairs which
should have been the responsibility of private enterprises and social organizations
grew to be monopolized by the central government or by local governments.
Traditionally, people tended to agree that the rule of government was limitless.
This attitude has directly affected the smooth implementation of economic
structural reform.
C. The Necessity of Political Structural Reform
A socialist society needs further perfection. China's present overcentralized
political structure tends to monopolize just about everything: politics, economics,
culture, judicial functions and so on. China, a country with a long history of
feudalism, established the current political system on the basis of traditional
theses, as well as on Soviet models and on wartime practices during the years
prior to liberation. Overcentralization of power in political structures barred the
way of progress in the reform of economic and other structures. It also stifled
the initiative and creativity of various political, economic and cultural organiza-
tions. This is why it is imperative to carry out political structural reform.
Such a corresponding transformation of Chinese political structures will also
be necessary if China is to develop a commodity-based economy. A commodity
economy needs autonomous management, equal exchange, free choice, free
competition, attention to economic results, innovations and so forth. All these
require a political environment conducive to conditions of equality, freedom and
democracy. They require a transformation of traditional ideas and a reformation
of administrative structures, especially those of the government, so that indirect
control and administration may replace direct control and administration. These
conditions will be necessary to unleash the initiative of private enterprise.
In a socialist nation such as China, political structural reform demands
democratized management of state affairs. The cause of socialism will make
rapid progress only with the active participation of millions of ordinary people
in state affairs and in economic and social management. Although the process
of democratization differs in the various socialist countries, progress towards
democracy is their common trend. China too, is trying to gradually realize the
goal of democratization through political structural reform.
Political structural reform will also require the scientific and legalized man-
agement of state affairs. As with economic monopoly, political monopoly inev-
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itably evolves towards corruption and dictatorship. This has been proven by the
history of many countries, including China. Several major defects in China's
political structure need to be reformed; they involve the following aspects:
First, China must recognize that a system of checks and balances is the most
efficient and reasonable relationship of power among different state organs.
When the legislative, administrative and judicial power of a country is concen-
trated in one person or one organization, direct or disguised dictatorship will
emerge, and the democracy and freedom of the people cannot be secured.
Therefore, the principle of balance and check is not only applicable to capitalist
countries, but also to socialist countries.
Second, state organizations should follow the principle of unity of obliga-
tions, rights and responsibilities in their organizational and administrative work.
Violation of this principle, as is currently the case, causes overconcentration of
power in top leadership. It leaves organizations and functionaries at lower levels
with no power to make independent decisions. It hampers their initiative and
discourages efficiency.
Third, socialist countries should follow the rule of law. Democratic politics
must be the politics of law, and law in a socialist country should represent the
will of the people. Violation of this principle-the practice of any kind of
individual rule-will inevitably lead to dictatorship and authoritarianism.
D. Democratization: The Central Target of Political Reform
The long-range target of China's reform is to establish an efficient, socialist
political structure with a high degree of democracy and an adequate legal system.
The concrete contents of China's political reform consist of the following points:
Democratization of Politics. China must guarantee its citizens popular par-
ticipation in government, popular management, popular supervision, popular
check-ups and popular decisionmaking, all with full civil rights. The people's
congress should remain the fundamental political unit of China. However, it is
important to establish closer ties between people's congresses of different levels
and the masses in order that the people's congresses can better act on behalf of
those they represent, and under their closer supervision. Democratic elections
must be facilitated, and the electoral system must be better organized. Democ-
ratization of politics also requires a reasonable division of power among various
state organs and political organizations, so as to guarantee their democratic and
efficient operation.
Openness of Politics. Without openness in politics, people will be unable to
participate in or to supervise politics. State organs should establish a system to
report to the people periodically. People's deputies should report to and consult
with their constituencies. Newspapers, radios and television should have the right
to disclose all violations of the Chinese Constitution or of other laws, and similar
abuses of power. Openness of politics helps guarantee social supervision and
guards against political mistakes by government officials of different levels.
Scientific Decisionmaking. Unscientific decisionmaking, such as decision-
making on the basis of an individual leader's personal experience, must be
resolutely overcome. In order to guarantee scientific decisionmaking, China should
strengthen its institutions of information, consultation and supervision. As a
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foundation, these institutions should rely upon existing decisionmaking and
decision-implementing organs.
Legal Rules in Political Operations. Democratic politics must be politics of
the "rule of law." The rule of individual leaders' directives, the rule of slogans
or the rule of political campaigns should never be allowed. Only dictators fail
to tolerate legal regulation and believe in the rule of man over the rule of law.
It must be recognized that state organs, political organizations and leading cadres
have no rights beyond the Constitution and laws.
Institutionalization of Supervision. One of the serious lessons of China's
political life has been in the feebleness of its supervising organs. Their lack of
power in the past created an environment in which serious errors in decision-
making could not be corrected or diverged from before the death of the deci-
sionmaker. This was a source of deep calamity for the Chinese state and its
people. Only when the organs of supervision have the power to operate without
interference from various other directions can they act independently and effec-
tively.
E. Separating the Functions of Party and Government as the Central Link in
Political Reform
Leadership of the CCP in China's political life has been the result of the
nation's past one hundred years of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal history.
Furthermore, the Party remains the core of China's socialist construction. This
is the reality. But, for a long time, there has been a serious problem of confusion
over the division of functions between the Party and the government. Since the
late 1950's, China has emphasized the unification of Party leadership with that
of governmental enterprises and institutions. Many Chinese even regard this as
a criterion for supporting the leadership of the Party. This system grew stronger
with every political movement. As a result, Party committees have come to
monopolize many administrative affairs. Bulky Party organs and large numbers
of full-time cadres must be maintained accordingly.
Therefore, political structural reform cannot start unless China first resolves
the confusion of functions between the Party and the government; especially the
usurpation of the latter's responsibilities by the former. In such a situation, the
autonomous exercise of authority by the government, by people's congresses and
by judicial organs has been seriously obstructed. Separation of functions between
the Party and government means that activities of the Party should be confined
within the limit of the Constitution and the laws. The leadership of the party in
power should mainly give guidance in policies and principles; it should guarantee
and supervise professional affairs; it should engage in political and ideological
work and it should set good examples in all aspects of life and work.
Of course, the confusion of responsibility between the CCP and the govern-
ment has its historical conditions and its historical background. The system was
developed during the revolutionary war years and was subsequently strengthened
in repeated political campaigns. It was adaptable to the model of mandatory
planning.
Now the situation is different. The modernization of development demands
the initiative of various institutions and sources. It also requires the operation
of various organizations. The practices of the war years cannot meet the needs
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of the current years of peaceful construction. The ways of mass movement cannot
meet the needs of a modern nation. The institution of high centralization cannot
meet the needs of a commodity economy. These conditions have been dictated
by historical conditions and by the requirements of reform.
Just as with the development of a socialist commodity economy, the political
reform of socialist democratic politics will be an evolutionary process of gradual
accumulation. China's modernization confronts complicated social contradictions.
It needs a stable socio-political environment. Therefore, a "large democracy"
which may damage the legal system of the state or destabilize the society should
be discouraged.
F. Political Structural Reform and Transformation of Ideas
China is a country with over two thousand years of feudal autocratic tradition
and authoritarian experience. The characteristics of China's political culture
greatly emphasized the rule of man over the rule of law. Traditional political
philosophy stressed the rule of "good emperors and wise dukes," the politics of
"the honest and upright statesman" and "seeking exoneration and justice from
good officials." Such traditional political philosophy pinned hopes of good
government purely on the personal integrity and moral persuasion of those who
ruled. Such political ideas and ways of thinking still exist. Even after the
Revolution, many people cherished hope for solutions to social and economic
problems in "good cadres" and "upright leaders" rather than in instititutional
and structural reforms. To overcome such unhealthy tendencies as favoritism,
nepotism, jobbery and backdoorism, China's leaders sought more to raise personal
levels of consciousness and to appeal to individual leaders' consciences than to
improve China's political institutions.
Political reform goes hand in hand with the elimination of remnant feudal
influences in ideology and politics. Long 4fter liberation, remnants of feudal
influences still exist in various aspects of Chinese society. As Deng pointed out
in his 1980 work, Reform of the Leadership System of the Party and the State,
all abuses in the political life of China and the CCP have much to do with
feudal influences on Chinese history. Therefore, now is the time to firmly
overcome remnant feudalism, through a series of institutional reforms. Otherwise,
Deng notes, the state and the people will suffer losses. Unhealthy tendencies
which emerged in recent years-such as the pursuit of personal gain through
one's position and authority-have, in the main, strong feudal tints.
Remnant feudal influences also form the major obstacle to China's trans-
formation from the rule of man to the rule of law. If feudal ideas like "power
first and law second" and "power counts more than law" are not wiped out,
democracy will be just an empty slogan.
PART II: SOME COMMENTS
Political structural reform in China will be quite a tough job. Taking into
consideration China's long history of feudalism as well as its turbulent history
since 1949, the process of political reform will not be smooth sailing. As noted
above, official ideas recognize democratization as the central link of political
structural reform. In general, this is undoubtedly the correct approach. But to
pursue this a step further, it should be noted that the key point of democratization
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may be to reform the Party itself. This reformation raises tricky questions. The
following points stand out.
First, conceptually, observers should recognize the de facto existence of
plural interests in socialist China. There is no so-called "monism of interest"-
no political, economic or moral conformity of the whole country-as China's
leaders repeatedly claimed in the past. Vertically, there exist the different interests
of the state, of society at large, of different regions, enterprises, collectives and
individuals. Horizontally, there are different interests among different social
strata and social groups, as well as among localities, professions and so on. It
is important to recognize that various interest groups exist in socialist society.
Reformers should pay attention to coordinating them.
Second, the long-term direction of political reform in China should be
towards political pluralism. The idea of a monist, absolute, infallible Party
leadership must be discarded, otherwise genuine democratization cannot be
achieved. Of course, one should adopt a realistic attitude towards the leading
role of the CCP in China. On one hand, one must understand the historical
experience which forms the foundation of today's reality. On the other hand,
the long-term target of any political reform in China must be political pluralism
if the reform is to activate all positive factors of the society for a prosperous
and desirable development of the whole country. Of course, this takes time.
But, even though for the time being China's one-party leadership seems
unlikely to change, something can still be done in this direction. Possibilities
include the strengthening of inner-party democracy in the CCP, strengthening
extra-party supervision over the CCP, strengthening roles played by democratic
parties and mass organizations and so on. The reform of the Party should include
both the reform of its theory and of its practices.
Since the start of the present reform in China, there have been several
positive developments in this respect. For example, the godlike image and
infallibility of Mao Zedong has been discarded. Also, reformers have returned
to the principles of seeking truth from objective facts and of taking practice as
the sole criterion of utility. The Party has recognized that theories of Marxism
and socialism are to be renewed and further developed but that those theories'
utopian theses-which were formulated by the Party's predecessors within the
limits of their historical conditions-are to be discarded. Dogmatic interpretations
of Marxism and the erroneous viewpoints imposed on it are finally being rejected.
The Party has also recognized that China is in the primary stage of socialism,
and that the central task of such a socialist society should be the expansion of
productive forces. The slogan, "class struggle is the central link" is seeing less
currency.
The Party has acheived some improvements in inner-party democracy (the
election system, for instance) and openness (journalists are now allowed to attend
and report on Party congresses). The Party has articulated some promising new
principles in the Party-government relationship, like the separation of functions
between the Party and government and the role of Party operations under the
new Constitution.
Finally, the official treatment of dissidents, who were formerly suppressed
politically or punished, has grown somewhat better than in the past. They now
have a chance to express their views or publish some of their writings. After
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having been forced out of their original positions, these people are being restored
to suitable employment. Some of them have been allowed to visit abroad and to
make professional tours.
But there is still a long way to go. When the Party won its nationwide
victory in 1949, it was not well prepared ideologically or theoretically to make
the drastic change of status to that of a party in power. Although Mao rightly
raised this point on the eve of 1949, the Party, including Mao himself, did not
pay serious attention to it as a practical matter. The power and privilege of the
Party grew inflated; Mao's "cult of personality" became stronger and stronger.
Party rectification campaigns solved few problems.
The mentality ascribing infallibility to the Party and to its top leaders created
an attitude of intolerance towards criticism or different viewpoints. This fatal
error has led to a divorce between the Party and the masses. Party campaigns
against bourgeois rightists exemplify this. The situation has changed very little.
Despite all its rhetoric and statements, the Party still clings to the image of a
flawless leadership. The Party did make certain self-criticisms after the fall of
the "Gang of Four," but one of the impressions this was intended to create was
that the Party was strong enough to discover and correct its own mistakes, even
one as big as the Cultural Revolution. Party suppression of "dissidents," "aliens"
and sharp critics of its policies, lines and practices drove many good people out
of its own camp. The struggle against "spiritual pollution" and the fight against
"liberalism" only helped to deepen the so-called "conviction crisis" and "con-
fidence crisis" in China and led to the Party's loss of popularity and credibility
among the people.
The principles of reform raised above still need a great effort to put them
in practice. The "rule of man" has not nearly been fundamentally reversed.
The Institutional Perspective
In Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism, David Stark and
Victor Nee make an in-depth analysis of the processes and theories of reform in
socialist countries. They conclude that new institutional reforms of state socialism
are incompatible with earlier traditional theories of totalitarianism and modern-
ization. Their argument assumes that state socialism represents a distinctive social
formation that has its own institutional logic and dynamics of development. This
logic is not derived from capitalist development. Socialism is seen neither as
capitalism's polar opposite nor its inevitable convergent future.
The new institutional perspective insists first that theories explaining processes
and outcomes in state socialism must take into account the institutional arrange-
ments specific to state socialism. Second, rather than exclusively focusing on
party and state elites, this perspective opens up socialist societies and economies,
and their respective relationships to the official organs of the state, as areas of
research. Thus, such important topics as subordinate social groups, popular
culture, social networks, consumer markets, entrepreneurship, organizational
innovations, political coalitions, local administration and new forms of political
representation all become objects of study.
This methodology is undoubtedly correct. Nonetheless, no matter what form
the course of study may take, it is still advisable to keep in mind that reform
of the Party is the key to overall reform of a socialist country. This is especially
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true for China, because the Party is in a position of absolute leadership.
In fact, Stark and Nee quote Susan Shirk's conclusion that it is precisely
the concentration of power in a few top leaders-who set the reform agenda,
shape "reformist" ideology and manage conflicts in subordinate agencies-that
provides the tools to implement change. Far from being an obstacle, such state
leadership can be the instrument of reform. Shirk gave the examples of East
Asia-Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and, to a more limited extent, Japan-
where market economies have thrived in states governed by a single dominant
political party. If China remains a one-party state, which it is likely to do, and
succeeds in creating an economy that relies on a mix of market and state
coordination, it will not be the first East Asian country to have done so.
Although these nations present current phenomena of successful development,
there remains another, deeper question: If these surprisingly successful economies
enjoyed democratic modes of government and pluralist politics with greater
popular support, would they not have also enjoyed healthier political, economic
and social development, more harmonious popular moods and a more stable
social order, as well as a more equitable distribution of income? After all, the
rapid development of the East Asian economies has been the result of various
combined factors. One should not give all the credit to single-party rule. If tlhis
kind of political system is favorable, why then all the calls and activism for
democratization and pluralist politics in these societies? Why, for instance, has
the mass struggle for democracy against the South Korean dictatorship repeatedly
caused political and economic losses, social turbulence and the deaths of many
innocent Korean citizens?
In China at present there are no symptoms nor any real possibilities of a
change from one-party rule. Still, one can only hope that efforts in this direction
will not disappear. In November 1988, Premier Zhao Zhiyang noted that the
current political structural reform aims to build up socialist democracy, but that
in the course of reform, the position of the CCP as ruling party will remain
unchanged. He added, however, that the Party's way of ruling will be changed.
He further added that China will soon begin to institute a system of multiparty
cooperation and consultation under the CCP's leadership, and he recommended
that China strive to improve and strengthen this system, since China's political
system needs not only multiparty cooperation but also unified supervision.
Maybe this is how far political reform in China can be carried out in the
foreseeable future.
III. A FEW POINTS OF COMPARISON BETWEEN REFORMS IN CHINA
AND IN THE SOVIET UNION
In comparing China and the Soviet Union, it is necessary to note certain
links between reform processes of socialist countries in general. It is also necessary
to probe the links between political and economic reforms.
The Reforms of the 1950's
Since the early 1950's, there have been several waves of reform in the socialist
world. Reform first centered on Nikita Khrushchev's criticism of the personality
cult of Joseph Stalin, and the subsequent process of "de-Stalinization." Khrush-
chev also had some new ideas concerning international communist movements
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and the international situation in general. In some countries, de-Stalinization
played a positive role in improving the leadership of the Party and in correcting
policy errors.
China did not draw enough lessons from the failures of Stalin's cult. And,
in any event, Khrushchev's reforms bore the characteristics of impetuosity and
rashness. Analytically, they failed to trace and counteract the historical and
institutional roots of Stalinism. Old political and economic institutions, as well
as the ideology they represented, remained unchanged by the so-called reform.
Instead, Khrushchev tried to guide economic construction with leftist slogans
such as, "speeding up the march towards Communism." His reform movement
ended in failure.
The Sixties
Reform in the 1960's started in mid-decade in the Soviet Union and in
eastern European countries. It centered on the transformation of economic
structures. During this time China was engulfed in the Cultural Revolution.
Consequently, the gap between the reformist steps of China and eastern Europe
grew wider.
Reforms in eastern Europe did differ from country to country. For example,
the Soviet Union confined its reform to improving some of its conventional
institutions, such as targets of planning and material incentives. Near the end of
the 1960's, however, in the face of pressures from different directions, the Soviets
had to abandon these reforms. Yugoslavia began its reform much earlier, and
concentrated on changing market mechanisms. It opened its economy to the
world, suspended mandatory planning and began to practise full autonomy of
private enterprise. Hungary's 1968 reforms replaced mandatory planning with the
expansion of the autonomy of enterprises. This strengthened the role of the
market, while at the same time the state still played the part of macroeconomic
guide. Of course, the most liberal reforms-those of the "Czech Spring" of
1968-were suppressed by the invasion of Soviet tanks.
The Seventies and Eighties
Since the end of the 1970's, reforms in socialist countries have actively begun
to unfold. Both China and the Soviet Union have carried on major fundamental
reforms. Despite differences in timing and in basic starting conditions, they have
common characteristics: the extension from partial experiment to overall reform,
the emphasis on thoroughgoing economic reform, the introduction of political
reform as a major step and the inevitable interference from latent feudalism and
rigid dogmatism.
But there have been many differences. First, reform in the U.S.S.R. started
from the top. Concrete measures lag behind the structural reshuffle, and it seems
that the rank and file cannot keep up with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's
call to reform. In China, on the other hand, structural reform lags behind the
concrete measures. More particularly, reform lags behind the demands of the
people to raise living standards.
Second, central planning institutions in the Soviet Union have deep roots
and are very rigid; this makes the introduction of market mechanisms more
difficult than in China. Furthermore, Gorbachev faces big resistance to his reform
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efforts from the Soviet Communist Party and from government bureaucrats as
well as from the beneficiaries of vested interests. Relatively speaking, planning
control in China was somewhat less tight than in the Soviet Union. For instance,
township enterprises and private commerce had greater prevalence, whether legal
or not.
Reform in China therefore enjoys a firmer foundation, as well as a more
positive response from the Chinese people. The economy took off immediately
after reform policies were declared. Improvements in people's livelihoods, the
introduction of market mechanisms and the condition of market supply all seem
to be advancing more quickly than in the Soviet Union. As Chinese Prime
Minister Li Peng noted at a press conference in Canberra last November, the
Soviet reforms, just as the Chinese reforms, will meet difficulties while proceeding,
but Soviet difficulties might be bigger than those faced by the Chinese.
Finally, however, the demographic condition and population quality of the
Soviet Union are more favorable than China's. The rural population in the Soviet
Union is thirty percent of its total population; that of China is eighty percent.
The educational level of the Soviet people is higher than that of China's citizens.
In the Soviet Union, there is relatively less egalitarianism in the wage system,
but there is no phenomenon of distorted remuneration between mental work and
manual work. Nevertheless, in the Soviet Union intellectuals enjoy better rewards
in general than their Chinese counterparts.
Still, for both nations, the main question remains the same. Where will the
new reforms take them and their people as socialism approaches its second
century?
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